The trajectory of the unobservable: commentary on Metaphysical Inference and the Experience of the Observable by Anjan Chakravartty
João Vitor Balbino
Anjan Chakravartty is a philosopher of science known for his work in the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of science. In his book "A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable" (2007), Chakravartty addresses questions related to the metaphysics of science, focusing on the nature of scientific objects, particularly those that are unobservable.
In “Metaphysical Inference and the Experience of the Observable”, from the contextualization of the abstractness of experience, considering that in different parts of philosophy, the word “experience” is used to refer to different things, the author observes that the philosophy of science , especially when we talk about how scientific theories and models help us understand the world, only refers to what we perceive directly with our senses, such as seeing, hearing, or feeling something. If we use scientific instruments, such as microscopes or Geiger counters, to detect things that our senses cannot perceive on their own, these things are considered "unobservable." Even though we can see the images or data that these instruments show us, the things they detect are not directly experienced and are therefore called unobservable in this philosophical terminology. From this, the author reveals the subject of his article: the nature of our experience of the observable world of scientific investigation. In other words, it refers to the way we perceive and understand the world when applying scientific methods.
The author is discussing the question of why we only focus on experiences related to phenomena that we can observe in science, when in fact there are many more things that we experience during scientific research. Some people question whether we shouldn't try to understand beyond what we can observe, exploring phenomena that are invisible but are important for making scientific predictions and explanations.
Historically, many antirealists defended strict forms of empiricism, which link scientific knowledge to directly observable experiences. For them, any metaphysical speculation (ideas about the world that cannot be tested or observed) should not be part of scientific knowledge. The author cites the phenomenalism of Ernst Mach, the conventionalism of Henri Poincaré regarding the nature of space and time, the instrumentalism of Albert Einstein's early works and the varied positions associated with logical empiricism. These are understandings of science that link the idea of scientific knowledge to conceptions about experience. In short, the discussion revolves around how far we should go in our search for scientific knowledge: should we stick only to what we can see and measure directly or should we try to understand things that are beyond the reach of our senses, even if we cannot observe them? them directly?
In light of this, the author argues that even when we adopt a narrow scientific approach, limiting our knowledge to what we can observe, we still need to turn to metaphysics (thinking about fundamental questions) to understand what this knowledge really means. The author argues that both scientific realists and anti-realists make "metaphysical inferences" (reasonings about what is beyond the observable) in their scientific interpretations. Even for empiricists (who rely only on direct experiences), the author states that some forms of metaphysical inference are inevitable when constructing a coherent understanding of the world. The conclusion is not a criticism of empiricism, but a suggestion that all scientific approaches, in some way, require metaphysical thinking to construct a comprehensible view of the world. In other words, understanding the nature of our scientific knowledge inevitably involves some level of reasoning about matters beyond what we can directly observe. In this context, the author discusses the question of the need and existence of "metaphysics" (thoughts about fundamental questions) when producing knowledge about the observable world through experience.
The author argues that even when we limit ourselves to direct observations and concrete facts, we still make metaphysical inferences to understand what these observations mean. Anjan explains that the term "metaphysics" is used in different ways, and in practice, people avoid using this term when they feel confident in their claims. The author also mentions the idea of "degrees of metaphysical inference", meaning that some metaphysical inferences are closer to empirical data than others. In short, even when we only hold to what we can directly observe, we still make metaphysical inferences to understand and interpret those observations.
Next, Anjan points to the existence of two main views: one that suggests that science is completely free of metaphysics, mainly defended by empiricists and instrumentalists, and another that argues that metaphysics is intrinsically linked to scientific practice. Empiricists and instrumentalists claim that science deals only with concrete and tangible observations, excluding any unobservable entities, which would eliminate the need for metaphysics. However, the author argues that, even when focusing only on the observable, the sciences still make metaphysical inferences to understand and explain observations. On the other hand, some philosophers, such as Thomas Kuhn, claim that metaphysics is fundamental to scientific practice, influencing everything from basic principles to complex theories. Thus, even if some empiricists try to avoid metaphysics in their interpretations of science, the intrinsic nature of scientific practice inevitably involves metaphysical questions. The author illustrates this ambiguity using specific examples. For example, he mentions the case of physicist Robert Millikan, who determined the fundamental electrical charge. Millikan assumed that certain quantities are quantized, that is, they exist in integer multiples of a specific unit. In contrast, another physicist, Felix Ehrenhaft, argued that these quantities are continuous. The question is: is this Millikan assumption an a priori belief (i.e., a conviction independent of experience) or an empirical hypothesis (a testable assumption based on evidence)?
The same dilemma arises in modern areas such as cancer research, where different theoretical approaches (such as genetic reductionism and organicism) may seem metaphysical but are also empirically tested. These examples illustrate how difficult it is to determine whether a belief is genuinely metaphysical or an empirical hypothesis. The author concludes that debates about whether or not science is permeated by metaphysics are inconclusive. However, he defends the idea that metaphysical inference is inevitable in the construction of scientific knowledge, but the question of how to understand these inferences in relation to views that restrict scientific knowledge to the observable world still remains open. In this sense, the author argues that even empiricists, who believe that knowledge should be based only on observable experience, still need to make metaphysical inferences to understand the world. To illustrate, the author uses the example of natural laws, which are often seen as purely empirical descriptions of the regularity observed in nature.
Next, he argues that even seemingly simple conceptions, such as the laws of physics, involve subtle metaphysical inferences. As in the example mentioned, when a straw appears crooked in a glass of water even though it is, in fact, straight. It is noteworthy that our understanding of what is observable in itself requires metaphysical inferences. It's not enough to just trust sensations; we need to infer which sensations are reliable to create an accurate understanding of the world around us. For example, he mentions that in some situations, our brain misinterprets sensory information, leading to misleading perceptions. Therefore, even determining what is truly observable requires metaphysical inferences, that is, a priori knowledge.
Along this path, the author also notes that there are some forms of empiricism (a philosophical approach that emphasizes the importance of experience) that attempt to completely avoid making statements about an external world or reality. These forms of radical empiricism, by denying the existence of an external world independent of our experiences, can prevent some metaphysical inferences. However, he suggests that these views are extremely restrictive and are not widely accepted or practiced in contemporary science. Therefore, for most people and scientists who rely on observations to understand the world, metaphysical inference is inevitable and necessary to evaluate the reliability of our experiences. As stated in the following excerpt:
Although I have argued that traditional debates about whether or not metaphysics is part of science are inconclusive, I hope to have shown that, once we clarify the nature of metaphysical inference, as I have done here, we see that they are clearly indispensable even for scientific descriptions of observables, to differentiate good observations from bad ones and, among the good ones, the best ones. (Chakravartty, 2017 p. 202 - 203, our translation).
Given this, in scientific practice, scientists often invoke theories and models that include metaphysical assumptions and inferences to explain complex observable phenomena. Anjan Chakravartty suggests that when using theories to explain observations, scientists are making metaphysical inferences, as they are assuming the existence of underlying entities and processes to explain observable phenomena. Thus, even for empiricists, it is inevitable to make metaphysical inferences to understand the observable world and that these inferences are an intrinsic part of scientific practice. The author mentions important philosophers from the last century, such as Wilfrid Sellars, Norwood Russell Hanson, Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn, who argued about the role of prior theoretical beliefs in the formation of scientific experience. In this sense, Anjan argues that, although not all experiences are theory-laden, many of them are influenced by our beliefs and theoretical conceptions. In the sciences, there are contexts in which these metaphysical inferences are inevitable. He highlights the need to recognize that the strict division between "theoretical" terms (which refer to supposedly unobservable entities) and terms for observable entities is not as clear as it used to be, especially since our prior theories and beliefs play a significant role in interpretation and in the formation of our observable experiences. Therefore, even when dealing with seemingly straightforward and observable phenomena, some metaphysical inferences are essential for complete understanding. Finally, the author discusses how we make metaphysical inferences (i.e., philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality) when classifying our experiences to construct scientific knowledge about the observable world. He mentions two senses in which these inferences are inevitable:
1) Shared Taxonomy and Methodology: To make judgments about experience and distinguish between true and false experiences, we need to classify what we observe into descriptive categories. This is essential for the scientific community to function coherently. These categories are learned through specific training and cannot simply be derived from immediate experiences. The author calls these "background commitments" and argues that they are a crucial part of scientific practice, even when it concerns only the observable world.
2) Metaphysical Background: The author goes further and explores the nature of this "background", which is a collection of shared tacit knowledge, a mixture of cognitive skills, heuristics and social and cultural elements. He suggests that this "background" is a complex entity underlying scientific practices and is something that is not simply derived from direct experience. Although it is not observable, it is postulated to explain several observable characteristics of successful scientific practice. Theorizing about this "background" is a form of metaphysical inference, as it involves assumptions about its complex nature and its role in the construction of scientific knowledge.
In summary, the author argues that even when dealing with the observable world, metaphysical inferences are necessary to understand and classify our experiences, as well as to explain the complexity of successful scientific practices. Therefore, even those who adopt an empiricist approach (which values experience as the basis of knowledge) end up making these metaphysical inferences to develop a deeper understanding of observable reality. This is a very relevant thought, when directed to the theory of knowledge, in its various aspects. Precisely, I would like to point out the political philosophy. In this context, metaphysics is critically observed by sensible people, but highly appreciated by fundamentalists to justify their private interests.
Thus, the main challenge to accepting natural law considerations lies in the diversity of moral and cultural perspectives around the world. Natural law, by basing moral principles on a specific metaphysical narrative, can be interpreted as a cultural imposition, ignoring the varied ethical and moral traditions that exist globally. Furthermore, the transition from what is factual (how the world is) to what is morally correct (how it should be) presents a logical gap that is difficult to overcome. While jusnaturalism argues for an objective basis for morality, this basis is challenged by the dialectics produced by cultural diversity and the complexity of human beliefs, raising questions about the validity of a single universal metaphysical narrative.Furthermore, what is considered "observable" for some is not considered "observable" for others, so that the scientific difficulty also applies to the “observable”, in the context of the human sciences, for example, in which certain social and economic phenomena can be obscured or neglected in favor of observing phenomena that are more convenient for the dominant narrative, based on an incorrect explanation, but which fulfills the role of illusory “justification”. In view of this, because it is finalistic, teleological, human practice is necessarily directed to the being of things, whose knowledge is a condition for objectifying their purposes. In other words, praxis must have some ontological foundation, which cannot be ignored completely. Thus, since the world is a structural equation of complexes, human praxis cannot be limited to the immediate and empirical being of things. So that neither the structural world is exhausted in the phenomenal nor the social world is exhausted in its ultimate form, from which the historical genesis is erased, as Marx said. (Duayer, 2016) In this context, faced with the erased, that is, the trajectory of the observable made unobservable and vice versa, such as social dynamics, Chakravartty's considerations prove to be even more interesting, as well as challenging. In view of this, analyzing this "background" and the impossibility of escaping metaphysical inference to make judgments about experience and distinguish between true and false experiences, the concern with classifying what we observe as descriptive categories proves even more elementary. In other words, essential for the scientific community to function in a coherent and self-critical manner. Finally, it is a process of humility worthy of Socrates, having to remember that to know something it is necessary, first of all, to recognize the ignorance and limitations that surround us. As Ortega y Gasset observes: “I am I and my circumstance; if I do not save it, I do not save myself.” (Ortega y Gasset, 1914-1966, p. 322, our translation).
- CHAKRAVARTTY, Anjan. Inferência metafísica e a experiência do observável. Principia, Florianópolis, 21(2), 2017, pp.189-207.
- DUAYER, M. Marx e a crítica ontológica da sociedade capitalista: crítica à centralidade do trabalho." Verinotio - Revista on-line de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas . Ano XI. out./2016. n. 22. Disponível em: < http://www.verinotio.org/conteudo/0.04131558727595544.pdf>.
- ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. (1966). Meditaciones del Quijote. In Obras completas de José Ortega y Gasset (7aed., Vol.1, pp. 310-400). Madrid: Revista de Occidente. (Trabalho original publicado em 1914).
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